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INTRODUCTION
Under the Kyoto Protocol, developed countries had specific obligations to control their greenhouse gas emissions, but developing countries did not. The Copenhagen Accord ends this distinction. For the first time, all the major economies at Copenhagen pledged to take specific individual responsibilities, with Annex I (developed) countries invited to submit their targets for emissions reductions and non-Annex I (developing) countries to submit their intended mitigation actions. By 31 January 2010 all had submitted their pledges to cut or limit their greenhouse gas emissions by 2020 to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, the deadline set by the Copenhagen Accord.
This has never happened before.
No doubt, Copenhagen was disappointing to many, particularly given that U.S. President Obama pledge's "yes, we can" had raised high expectations for this meeting.
However, as argued in Zhang (2009a) , international climate negotiations for an immediate post-2012 climate regime should not attempt unrealistic goals. With not all of the factors discussed in Zhang (2009a) met for a legally binding global agreement, the Copenhagen Accord is probably the best that could be achieved. The situation could be worse because the negotiations could have completely collapsed. While falling far short of the legally binding global agreement, the Accord reflects a political consensus on the main elements of the future framework among the major emitters and representatives of the main negotiating groups.
Also for the first time, China was blamed for dragging its feet on international climate negotiations, previously the accusations always targeted on U.S. French President Nicolas Sarkozy publicly criticized China, saying that China was impeding progress in climate talks (Watts 2009 ). British Energy and Climate Change Secretary Ed Miliband (2009) even wrote in The Guardian that China led a group of countries that "hijacked" the climate negotiations which had at times presented "a farcical picture to the public".
In the run up to and at Copenhagen, China took the initiative to ally with India and other major developing countries, took full advantage of being the world's largest carbon emitter, and attempted to secure a deal to its advantage. It is widely reported that China walked away "happy". But that did not come without a high price tag. Whether to admit or not, China angered allies, abandoned principles that it stuck during two weeks of talks, and is likely to stoke anti-China sentiment in Western nations. The too early appearance of this sentiment does not do any good to China because it still has to evolve from a large country to a country that is truly strong in e.g., science, technology, innovation, economy, etc. Officially China was backed by allies like India and Brazil, but they admitted in private that this was mainly China's battle (Graham-Harrison 2009) .
Against this background, in this paper, I will first share my thoughts on China's stance and reactions at Copenhagen. Some reactions are well rooted because of realities in China. Some reactions could have been handled more effectively for a better image of China, provided that there were good preparations and deliberations. I then address the reliability of China's statistics on energy and GDP, an issue crucial to the reliability of China's carbon intensity commitments. Finally, I discuss flaws in current international climate negotiations and close with my suggestion that international climate negotiations need to focus on 2030 as the targeted date.
REFLECTIONS ON CHINA'S STANCE AND RESPONSES
Let me start with the widely reported episode of China rejecting unilateral greenhouse gas emissions cut by industrialized countries. In my view, this is one area that China could have handled more effectively in Copenhagen. Miliband (2009) As suggested in Zhang (2009c) , China should insist on at least 80 percent emissions reduction by the developed countries, and in the meantime demand that per capita greenhouse gas emissions for all major countries by 2050 should be no more than the world's average at that time.
There are reasons that explain why China took a tough position at Copenhagen. because China failed to keep the expansion of inefficient and highly polluting industries under control and to implement its own industrial restructuring and sustainable development policies, and but because China is still on a course of rapid industrialization and urbanization. This in turn requires the consumption of energy to produce energyintensive steels, cement, glasses etc for cars, buildings, houses and public infrastructure because China as a large country can not depend entirely on imports as a small country can do. Moreover, small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) are key to employment for each country. This is particularly important for China to address its employment issues and the maintenance of social stability, because of its huge surplus labor force in the world's most populous country and its not well developed social safety net. SMEs in China employ 80 percent of the total working population and produce 60 percent of the economic output. They have served as a driving force for China's economic success over the past three decades. Largely dictated by the current level of development in China, however, these SMEs use much more, sometimes even more than 100 percent energy to produce the same unit of output as their state-owned, large and modern counterparts.
While China should take the main responsibilities for this, the U.S. had also played a role here. At Kyoto, the U.S. had made legally binding greenhouse gas emissions commitments. The Kyoto target was seen as not high enough but yet not unreasonable given that the U.S. economy would not be disrupted unreasonably. This might provide the U.S. some "moral" grounds on which to argue that developing countries should take meaningful mitigation action (Zhang 2000) . The U.S. commitments at Kyoto and the diplomatic and public pressure on China put China in a very uncomfortable position. It looked like China would be pressured to take on commitments at much earlier date than what China wished (Zhang 2009a ).
This situation changed once the U.S. withdrew from the Kyoto Protocol. The U.S.
withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol in 2001 not only led current U.S. emissions to be well above their 1990 levels but the world also lost eight years of concerted efforts towards climate change mitigation and adaptation, and it also removed international pressure on China to take climate change mitigation actions at a time when the Chinese economy was growing rapidly. Coincidentally, beginning 2002 that China reversed a declining trend in its energy intensity experienced over the last two decades in the past century, experiencing faster energy consumption growth than economic growth (see Figure 1 ). It would be inappropriate to blame this on the U.S., but if the U.S. did not withdraw from the Kyoto Protocol, for its own concerns for competiveness the U.S.
would have kept pressuring on China as it did immediately after Kyoto and is doing again, China would be constantly alert about its greenhouse gas emissions. As a result, China's actual greenhouse gas emissions would be much lower than their current levels. 30 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 Year tce/1980 US$'000 of GDP Adding the rapidly growing CO 2 emissions, China has realized increasing difficulty in controlling its CO 2 emissions. China has incorporated for the first time in its five-year economic plan an input indicator as a constraint -requiring that energy use per was due partly to the economic crisis that reduced the overall demand, in particular the demand for energy-intensive products. Overall, China's energy intensity was cut by 10.1 percent in the first three years of the plan relative to its 2005 levels. This suggests that the country needs to achieve almost the same overall performance in the remaining two years as it did in the first three years in order to meet that national energy intensity target. It will certainly not be easy to achieve that goal.
These reductions in China's energy intensity have already factored in the revisions of China's official GDP data from the second nationwide economic census, part of the government's continuing efforts to improve the quality of its statistics, whose accuracy has been questioned by both the general public inside of China and many analysts both inside and outside of China. Such revisions show that China's economy grew faster and shifted more towards services than the previously estimated, thus benefiting the energy intensity indicator. Even so, it is still not easy for China to achieve its own set energy-saving goal. If there were no upward revisions of GDP data, it would be impossible at all to meet that target. I will return to the statistical issues later when taking about verification, the issue that is of greatest concern to the U.S. and other industrialized countries at Copenhagen.
Thirdly, there are profound implications of government decentralization. Over the past three decades, China has decentralized with respect to allocation and responsibility and has shifted control over resources and decision-making to local governments. This devolution of decision-making to local levels has placed environmental stewardship in the hands of local officials who typically are more concerned with economic growth than the environment (Zhang 2007a and 2008) . As is often the case, what the center wants is not necessarily what the center gets, as in the old Chinese saying, "The mountains are high, and the emperor is far away".
In addition to the distorted evaluation criterion for officials on which local officials typically have been promoted based on how fast they expand their local economies, objectively speaking, the current fiscal system in China plays a part in driving local governments to seek higher GDP growth at the expense of the environment. This is because that tax-sharing system makes it hard to reconcile the interests of the central and local governments (Zhang 2008 and 2009b) . Since the tax-sharing system was adopted in Table 1 ). In the meantime, the share of the central government in the total government expenditure just rose by 2 percent. By 2008, local governments only accounted for 46.7 percent of the total government revenue, but their expenditure accounted for 78.7 percent of the total government expenditure in China. To enable to pay their expenditure for culture and education, supporting agricultural production, social security subsidiary, etc., local governments have little choice but to focus on local development and GDP. That will in turn enable them to enlarge their tax revenue by collecting urban maintenance and development tax, contract tax, arable land occupation tax, urban land use tax, etc. Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China (2009).
The factors described are far from comprehensive, but they are sufficient enough to illustrate great challenges ahead for China and constraints on its development and climate commitments. Of course, the above discussion does not justify no further action by China. Rather, given the fact that China is already the world's largest carbon emitter and its emissions will continue to rise rapidly as it is approaching becoming the world's largest economy, China is seen to have greater capacity, capability and responsibility. The country is facing great pressure both inside and outside international climate negotiations to exhibit greater ambition in limiting its greenhouse gas emissions. Moreover, China will continue to be confronted with the threats of trade measures, as long as it does not signal well ahead the time when it will take on the emissions caps (Zhang 2009c,d) .
Indeed, there are many things that China can do to reduce its own carbon footprint.
To that end, just prior to the Copenhagen climate summit, China pledged to cut its carbon intensity by 40-45 percent by 2020 relative its 2005 level. A lot of discussion has since focused on whether such a pledge is ambitious or just represents business as usual. China considers it very ambitious, whereas Western scholars view it just business as usual.
Objectively speaking, it is somewhere in between. It would not be seen as ambitious as 
MEETING CHINA'S CARBON INTENSITY: THE RELIABILITY ISSUE OF CHINA'S STATISTICS ON ENERGY AND GDP
China is not known for the reliability of its statistics (e.g., Rawski 2001 ). China's refusal to budge on U.S. and other industrialized country's demands for greater transparency and checks at Copenhagen was cited by negotiator after negotiator as a key block to reaching a deal. As long as China's pledges are in the form of carbon intensity, the reliability of both emissions and GDP data matters.
Assuming the fixed CO 2 emissions coefficients that convert consumption of fossil fuels into CO 2 emissions, the reliability of emissions data depends very much on energy consumption data. Unlike the energy data in the industrial product tables in the China Statistical Yearbook, the statistics on the primary energy production and consumption are usually revised in the year after their first appearance. As would be expected, the adjustments made to production statistics are far smaller than those made to consumption statistics, because it is usually easier to collect information on a small number of energy producers than a large number of energy consumers. Table 2 In all three years, these adjustments were driven by the upward revisions of 8-13 percent made to the coal consumption figures to reflect the unreported coal production mainly from small, inefficient and highly polluting coal mines that were ordered to shut down through a widely-publicized nationwide campaign beginning in 1998 but many of which had reopened because in many cases localities had backtracked to preserve local jobs and generate tax revenues as well as personal payoffs. In recent years, preliminary figures for energy use are almost the same as the final reported ones. 
A WAY FORWARD
Now let us see how to go from here. For me, the U.S. Congress passing a climate bill to cap U.S. greenhouse gas emissions has more impact on the future levels of greenhouse gas emissions than China's current stance. As long as commitments from the world's two largest greenhouse gas emitters differ in form, the U.S. Senate seems unlikely to pass a bill to cap its emissions without imposing strict carbon tariffs, and China is constantly confronted with the threats of trade measures whenever the U.S. Senate is shaping its climate bill (Zhang 2009d ).
This dilemma is partly attributed to flaws in current international climate negotiations, which have been focused on commitments on the two targeted dates: 2020 and 2050 (Zhang 2009d would be in 2020. However, the problem with this date is that it does not accommodate well the world's two largest greenhouse gas emitters, namely the U.S. and China.
Because the U.S. withdrew from the Kyoto Protocol, it has not made any substantial preparations to cut emissions as other Kyoto-constrained industrialized countries have done over the past decade. Whether you like it or not, this is a political reality. It is very hard for a unprepared country like the U.S. to take on a substantial emissions cut in 2020 as developing countries have demanded.
In the meantime, China overtook the U.S. to become the world's largest China, the U.S. has pushed for China to take on emissions caps as early as 2020.
Otherwise, the goods from China to U.S. markets will be subject to carbon tariffs.
However, as argued in Zhang (2009c,d) , the year 2020 is not a realistic date for China to take the absolute emissions cap. 
